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1 Introduction
Sudan is geographically the largest country in
Africa, covering an area of about 1 million square
miles. Besides its enormous size, Sudan is also a
land of extraordinary diversity with an estimated
population of about 28 million that is divided into
about 56 ethnic groups and more than 595 sub-
ethnic groups who speak more than 115 languages.
Sudan is justifiably considered as a microcosm of
Africa because of its central location, reflecting
within its borders all the racial, ethnic, religious
and cultural diversity of the continent.
Tragically, since its independence in 1956, Sudan
has been at war with itself and about 36 of the past
46 years have been wasted in two major civil wars
(1955–72, 1982–present). These conflicts have
been perceived as reflecting a cleavage between the
dominant Islamic and ‘Arabised’ north – two-thirds
of the land and population – and the subordinated,
but potentially richer ‘African’ south that is
predominantly traditional in its religious beliefs.
Since the current civil war erupted in 1982, Sudan
has experienced recurrent famines – notably in 1984,
1988, 1991 and 1998 – while the south, which was
not famine-prone during the first civil war (1955–72)
or the inter-war period of 1972–82, has suffered two
major famines, in 1988 and 1998. The increased
vulnerability to famine of the war-affected population
highlights the need to understand better the
complexity of this ongoing conflict.
This article is an attempt to highlight the link
between increased vulnerability to famine in
southern Sudan and the unique characteristics of
the current civil war, particularly the global
dimension, which has often been overlooked in
famine analysis. As the national and micro-level
factors that contributed to the famine of 1998 are
discussed at length in Deng (1999), this article
focuses on how new and additional global factors
unfolded into increased household vulnerability to
famine, specifically through intensification of
counter-insurgency warfare.
2 The magnitude of famine in 1998
2.1 Malnutrition
The nutritional status of a community during a
‘complex emergency’ is generally assessed throughIDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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the nutritional status of children younger than 5
years. A nutrition survey conducted by UNICEF in
June 1998 in the Bahr el Ghazal region showed a
considerable deterioration in nutrition status,
particularly in areas exposed to counter-insurgency
warfare (Awiel, Wau, Twic and Gogrial), as shown
in Figure 1. While the level of severe acute
malnutrition averaged about 20 per cent among the
resident population, it reached as high as 40 per
cent among the internally displaced population.
The nutrition assessment also indicated a higher
prevalence of malnutrition among boys than girls;
a difference that eroded as the situation started
improving. The social profile of households with
children in feeding programmes in Gogrial shows
no major difference between poor and non-poor
households, suggesting structural changes in the
initial wealth status of those communities exposed
to counter-insurgency warfare (Deng 1999: 12).
2.2 Mortality
The size of the population in southern Sudan is
highly politicised and is hotly debated by the local
authorities and humanitarian agencies, as there are
no commonly agreed population estimates. Even
the national population censuses that were
conducted in 1973 and 1983 were doubted and
questioned by southern Sudanese. The long history
of instability and civil war in southern Sudan has
also caused considerable distortion in the
demography of the region, particularly in patterns
of mortality and fertility, which makes any attempt
to assess aggregate famine mortality necessarily
subjective.
In assessing mortality during the famine in 1998,
the author used data from Medecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) (Belgium), Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation
Association (SRRA) and a survey personally
conducted in 1999. In comparison to other African
famines, the crude mortality rate (CMR) among the
resident population in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998 is
comparable to Ethiopia in 1973 and 1984/85,
Darfur (north Sudan) in 1984/85 and Niger in
1974. The CMRs among the displaced population
and children under 5 years of age during the 1998
famine were far higher than any other recent
African famines, as shown in Figure 2. In July
1998, the CMR peaked at 26/10,000 among the
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Figure 1: Prevalence of malnutrition in Bahr el Ghazal, June 1998
Source: UNICEF/Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
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adult displaced population and 46/10,000 among
children under 5 years of age. These rates greatly
exceeded the normal CMRs for developing
countries (Salama et al. 2001: 564).
As a baseline CMR is not available to assess excess
mortality during famine in 1998, the 1973
national census crude death rate of 36/1,000
persons during the census year (approximately
1/10,000 per day) was used, as a proxy for
baseline crude mortality. With actual CMR as
provided by various sources, Deng (1999: 17)
estimates excess mortality to be around 70,000
persons during the famine in 1998. Alternatively,
using the emergency CMR cut-off point (1/10,000
per day) as a baseline, together with actual average
CMR (1.9/10,000 per day) for the resident
population (721,529) and CMR (14.8/10,000 per
day) for the internally displaced population
(141,505) calculated from various sources (Deng
1999:16), the excess mortality during the period
of famine (April 1998–January 1999) is estimated
at about 78,000 persons.
3 Conduct of civil war: the curse
of assets
The links between civil war and vulnerability to
famine are fairly well understood in the context of
conventional civil wars. In the context of Sudan,
communities attach more importance to counter-
insurgency warfare than to conventional warfare
between the government and rebels, as counter-
insurgency warfare has more direct effects on their
livelihoods. In order to unpack the dynamics of
conflict in Bahr el Ghazal in the 1990s, Deng
(2002a) classifies counter-insurgency into exogenous
and endogenous warfare, where endogenous counter-
insurgency emanates from within the community,
while exogenous counter-insurgency originates from
outside. Deng (2002a) shows that endogenous
counter-insurgency has more profound negative
effects on rural livelihoods and household assets
management strategies than other forms of conflict.
It was found in the case of Sudan’s civil war that the
initial level of household asset-holdings is positively
related to the occurrence of endogenous counter-
insurgency warfare, with non-poor households
being more susceptible than the poor, primarily
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Figure 2: Famine crude mortality rates (CMR) in Africa 1973–98
Source: Seaman (1993), MSF (Belgium) and SRRA
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because of symmetric information (Deng 2002a).
Interestingly, while social capital was found to erode
in the context of endogenous counter-insurgency,
social cohesion and community-based risk sharing
arrangements tend to strengthen during exogenous
counter-insurgency. A strong and significant
positive correlation was found between famine
mortality in 1998 and initial wealth, particularly
among households exposed to endogenous
counter-insurgency warfare, whereas a ‘normal’
inverse correlation prevailed among households
exposed to drought.
The really puzzling question is: Why have
communities in southern Sudan, particularly in Bahr
el Ghazal region, become more prone to recurrent
famines during the current civil war than during the
first civil war of 1955–72? In attempting to answer
this question, this article discusses the main causes
of the current civil war, with an emphasis on global
factors that have translated into increased
vulnerability to famine in southern Sudan.
4 Unfolding of the global
dimension of famine causation
Though it is depressing, as mentioned by Devereux
(2000: 24), to explain the persistence of famine
long after it ought to have been eradicated, such
explanations are an important ingredient of a new
famine prevention policy agenda. Most theories
attribute contemporary famine to triggers such as
ecological shock, population growth, economic
crisis or civil war. This conceptualisation resulted
in famine being seen initially as an ‘act of God’ or
‘law of nature’ and more recently as ‘economic
crisis’ at household level or ‘act of man’ at national
level (Devereux 2001: 120). As such, the global
dimension has been overlooked. This article
attempts to highlight the global context in
explaining the Bahr el Ghazal famine of 1998, with
the aim of contributing to the synthesis of
theoretical debates and empirical experience.
4.1 The British colonial legacy:
structural political vulnerability and
exclusion
The first civil war erupted in 1955, just before
Sudan’s independence, and was primarily caused
by the British colonial authorities who falsely
forged the current united Sudan after pursuing a
pattern of development during the colonial period
that created social, economic and political
inequalities, which left the south absolutely and
relatively disadvantaged. For southerners, the
independence brokered between the British and
the northern elite was a mere changing of faces of
colonial power from the British to Arabised
northerners (Deng 1995: 135).
Not to the surprise of most southerners, successive
post-independence central governments pursued
policies that deliberately marginalised southerners
socially, economically and politically. The army,
police and employees of the southern Sudan
administration immediately after independence
became overwhelmingly ‘northern’, with
southerners occupying less than 10 per cent (14
out of 152 scale G officials) of the total senior
positions (Oduho and Deng 1963: 18). By 1960,
the share of southern Sudan in intermediate,
secondary and university education was,
respectively, less than 8 per cent (21 out of 270
total streams), 4 per cent (3 out of 71 total streams)
and 5 per cent (60 out of 1,216 total students)
(Oduho and Deng 1963: 46).
Even during the brief period of relative peace
(1972–82) after the Addis Ababa Agreement that
granted self-government to southern Sudan in
1972, the long-standing inequalities between north
and south worsened further. The south, ravaged by
17 years of civil war, failed to receive adequate
revenue transfers from central government, and the
average realised budget for the southern regional
government during this period barely covered 20
per cent of the planned budget (Deng 2002b: 14).
As a result of inadequate resourcing, social and
economic services deteriorated in the south relative
to the north. For example, the number of people
per hospital bed in 1980 was about 800 in
northern Sudan, but 2,000 in the south. Inequality
was more dramatic in terms of access to education,
as about 2,000 northerners shared one primary
school in 1980, compared with 8,000 southerners.
Even more striking was admission to the national
university, where about 3,500 northerners, but
almost 200,000 southerners, were competing for
one place in 1983. These profound horizontal
inequalities generated a sense of frustration and
feeling of injustice and exclusion that eventually
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led people in the south to resort again to armed
struggle (Yongo-Bure 1993: 51). Garang (1987: 21)
argued that ‘under these circumstances the
marginal cost of rebellion in the south became very
small, zero or negative; that is, in the south it pays
to rebel’.
During the current civil war, successive central
governments in the north promoted fierce counter-
insurgency warfare and invoked an Arab–Islamic
paradigm to mobilise the north Sudan, Arab and
Islamic world against the allegedly ‘infidel’ south,
particularly in regions adjacent to northern Sudan,
such as Bahr el Ghazal. These policies, that are
aimed at ruining people’s livelihoods, transferring
assets, extracting natural resources and enslaving the
south, are rooted in the British colonial legacy, which
handed over the south to northern domination. It is
this colonial legacy that has created the structural
vulnerability that continues to haunt and decimate
the communities of southern Sudan.
4.2 The crisis of subsistence in the
North: internationally sponsored
development and reform
The neo-Malthusian thesis attributes civil wars to
environmental degradation that has led to critical
scarcities of natural resources, and some
environmentalists have explained the current
Sudanese civil war in these terms. Suliman (1999:
88) argues that the nature of conflict in the Sudan
has evolved from a classic ethno-religious conflict
into one mainly over resources, driven by
economic crisis in the north.
In the early 1970s, the central government initiated
policies, sponsored by the World Bank, that
encouraged and subsidised shifts towards large-
scale, commercial and export-oriented agriculture
as a ‘quick fix’ to rapid economic development. In
1970, the government passed the ‘Unregistered
Land Act’, which effectively legitimised the state’s
control and ownership of any piece of land. This
act allowed the government to expropriate
thousands of hectares of prime savannah land from
the farming and pastoral communities, which were
then leased to wealthy citizens and foreign
investors for capital-intensive farming (Kebbede
1999: 115). It is estimated that during the 1970s
an average of 8,750 km2 of forest was removed
annually to make room for mechanised farming
(Berry and Geistfeld 1983: 69). The World Bank
alone provided funding for the clearing of more
than 2 million hectares of nomadic grazing land for
large-scale farms (Bennett 1987: 57). In southern
Kordofan in 1973 about 84,388 hectares of fertile
land was turned, with loans obtained from the
World Bank, into publicly and privately operated
mechanised farming schemes (Ahmed 1983: 55).
In southern Blue Nile, a wealthy Saudi Prince
obtained a 99-year lease on 464,000 hectares of
land ‘to produce sorghum to feed animals in the
oil-rich nations’ (Prendergast 1990: 41). One
consequence of wholesale forest clearing was the
rapid decline of the Acacia senegal, an important
tree for poor farmers as sources of both charcoal
and gum (Cater 1986: 10).
Moreover, many subsistence farmers and pastoralists
in northern Sudan lost their farms and grazing lands
during the 1970s. Economic necessity compelled
nomadic and agropastoralist communities in
Kordofan and Darfur to look for new grazing lands
or settlement areas to the south, creating tension and
conflicts over scarce grazing and cultivatable land.
The expansion of mechanised farming accelerated
deforestation as well as soil exhaustion, and
exacerbated the recurrent droughts in the early
1980s that ultimately resulted in the famine of
1984/85 in western Sudan. This subsistence crisis
prompted destitute herders to seek to replenish their
livestock through raiding, and traders with squeezed
profit margins to turn to financing cattle raiding in
the south as a lucrative business (de Waal 1996: 8).
These former herders also became easy prey for
successive central governments, who used them to
fight the rebellion in the south through counter-
insurgency warfare that subsequently caused the
famine of 1988. Keen (1994: 78) shows how famine
and displacement in the Bahr el Ghazal region were
strongly correlated, both geographically and
chronologically, with militia raids.
Besides the crisis of subsistence in the rural
economies in northern Sudan, the debt burden and
structural adjustment reforms prescribed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late
1970s crippled the national economy. While
Sudan’s foreign debt was about US$424 million in
1970; it reached US$6.12 billion in 1983. The debt-
export ratio, that was about 1:13 in 1970, reached
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5:78 in 1983, with debt service alone consuming
most of the country’s export earnings. As a result of
the second ‘oil shock’ in 1979/80, coupled with
deteriorating terms of trade, the cost of imports
doubled between 1980 and 1983, while export
earnings declined sharply. Consequently, the trade
deficit reached about US$626.5 million in 1983
compared with a trade surplus of US$10.8 million
in 1968. The level of foreign reserves also shrunk in
1983 to almost one-quarter of their 1965 level.
Sudan’s economic situation in the early 1980s was
described by Daly (1993: 22) as ‘a financial crisis of
unprecedented magnitude’. By 1983, the economy
had virtually imploded to the point of bankruptcy.
In order to appease right-wing Islamist opponents
and to retain power, the central government
stepped up ‘Islamisation’ and abrogated the Addis
Ababa Peace Agreement of 1983, thereby triggering
the current civil war in southern Sudan.
4.3 The curse of mineral resources
abundance in the south: multinational
corporations
The thesis of attributing the causes of civil war to
resource scarcity has recently been challenged by
contrary evidence that suggests that natural
resource abundance is a primary cause of conflict.
Some economists have provided empirical support
for the proposition that natural resource deposits
motivate rebels’ greed and fuel civil wars (Collier
2000: 2). The case of Sudan, however, suggests that
it is the greed of the ruling elite and multinational
corporations, rather than that of rebels, that
generated grievances and rebellion in the south.
The first historical contacts of the present southern
Sudan with the outside world – Arabs, Turkey,
Egypt, Britain – were characterised by brutal
invasion by outsiders ‘destitute of wealth’ in search
of resources such as gold, ivory, water and slaves
(Churchill 1940: 2). This pattern of extraction of
natural resources from the south continues to
benefit the north, with brutality on a massive scale
that characterises the Sudanese economy during
the post-colonial period, together with an
increasing role for multinational corporations. The
south, being well endowed with natural resources
and wealth, has become, paradoxically, a victim of
its virtues, which expose it to increasing
vulnerability to recurrent famines.
The extraction of oil from southern Sudan by
multinational corporations triggered and sustained
the current civil war through counter-insurgency
warfare. When commercial oil deposits were
discovered in southern Sudan in 1979 by the
Chevron Oil Company, information related to the
location and size of the oilfield was deliberately
concealed from the public because of fear that
discovery of such a huge economic resource in the
south would trigger renewed feeling among
southerners to secede. Southerners were also afraid
that the central government would steal their oil
reserves that they desperately needed for economic
rehabilitation after 17 years of civil war. This fear
was crystallised in 1980, when the central
government redrew the map of Sudan to shift the
northern areas of the south – where the oilfields
were discovered – into the north (Lesch 1998: 48).
This action was followed by shifting the site of the
oil refinery from Bentiu in the south to Kosti and
later to Port Sudan in the north.
In an effort to create a stable operational
environment for Chevron to exploit the oilfields
without interference from the south, the central
government unilaterally abrogated the Addis Ababa
Peace Agreement in 1983, by dividing the south
into three weaker regions and transferring southern
soldiers (former rebel fighters) to the north. These
actions further provoked and infuriated the
southerners, and directly fuelled the current civil
war. After its formation in 1983, the rebel
movement in the south immediately attacked and
disrupted the oil development and forced Chevron
to suspend its operations by mid-1984.
The idea of a ‘militia strategy’ in Sudan’s civil war is
linked to oil development and gained momentum in
the late 1970s, when the central government failed
to provide security around the Chevron oilfield
operations in the south. With the economic crisis in
the late 1970s, the central government
subcontracted the impoverished Arab pastoralists in
western Sudan as a local self-provisioning protection
force for the oilfields. The ‘militia’ was later adopted
by near-bankrupt successive central governments as
an opportunistic way of waging counter-insurgency
warfare in the south during the 1980s.
In order to resume development of the oilfields in
southern Sudan, the central government exploited
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divisions within the ranks of the rebel movement,
and succeeded in creating a split in 1991. It then
used the rebel splinter groups together with Arab
militias to intensify counter-insurgency warfare
during the 1990s. By 1992, oil production resumed
and the government started exporting oil in 1997, a
year prior to the famine in Bahr el Ghazal region. It
is not paradoxical that the occurrence of famine is
neatly correlated with production of oil, as this
generated the necessary resources to finance the
government’s military expenditure. The national
military budget was 80.6 billion Sudanese pounds
in 1995–6, and reached 932 billion Sudanese
pounds in the year 2000, when oil exports
accounted for about 75 per cent of total exports (as
shown in Figure 3). It is interesting to observe from
Figure 3 that while inflation declined dramatically
in 1998 in northern Sudan as a result of oil
extraction from the south, the crude mortality rate
among children under 5 years of age reached as
high as 46 during the famine in Bahr el Ghazal
region in 1998 (see Figure 2).
The oil development has devastated the livelihoods
of the communities around the oilfields. Recent
reports (Gagnon and Ryle 2001: 33; Christian Aid
2001: 22) show how oil is funding and sustaining the
civil war and how the government of Sudan is
pursuing ‘scorched earth’ policies to clear the oilfields
of civilians in order to make way for the exploration
of oil by foreign international oil companies. The
government uses a wide range of multinational oil
corporations to conceal its violations of human rights
and massive displacement of the local communities
of the oilfield areas. There are about 17 exploration
and 25 development oil wells in southern Sudan,
which are managed by multinational corporations
from Canada (Talisman), Sweden (Lundin), France
(Elf), Italy (Agip), Austria (OMV–AG), Netherlands
(Dutch Shell), Belgium/France (TotalFina), Gulf,
Malaysia and China with estimated daily production
of more than 250,000 barrels. These multinational
corporations are becoming part of the government
policy of ‘scorched earth’ as they effectively fund war
efforts and thus participate in exacerbating the
suffering of the inhabitants of the oilfield areas and
derail the prospects for peace in the Sudan (Gagnon
and Ryle 2001: 33; International Crisis Group 2002:
132).
4.4 International aid agencies: The
‘normalisation’ of crisis
The dilemma faced by humanitarian intervention
during complex emergencies is subsumed in current
development jargon, which insists that ‘Africans do
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Figure 3: Sudan oil exports and consumer price inflation 1992–2000
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
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not starve, they cope’ (Seaman 1993: 27). Davies
(1993: 61) argues that an emphasis on ‘coping’ may
blind policymakers and researchers to the need for a
radical reappraisal of the requirements of people’s
livelihoods in marginal areas. Since the mid-1990s,
there has been growing criticism of humanitarianism,
particularly relief aid, which is characterised as
addressing symptoms, creating dependency,
incapacitating social institutions and undermining
markets (Macrae 1998: 315). This criticism resulted
in the ‘relief-development continuum’ gaining
momentum, with increasing emphasis on reducing
relief and working with communities to increase
their capacities, in order to ensure sustainability. This
‘normalisation’ of crisis, as described by Bradbury
(1998: 330), is characterised by a creeping
acceptance of higher levels of vulnerability,
malnutrition and morbidity. As a result donors
started shifting their funding away from relief aid,
which resulted in a global decline in aid transfers and
persistent under-funding of UN operations in
complex emergencies (Bradbury 1998: 334).
In the context of southern Sudan, the relief food
delivered by the World Food Programme (WFP)
declined from 30,020 metric tons in 1993 to only
12,484 metric tons in 1997, with Bahr el Ghazal
receiving the least (Figure 4). These declining food
aid flows during the 1990s did not reflect the
increasing vulnerability of Bahr el Ghazal region,
where counter-insurgency warfare intensified and
drastically eroded livelihoods. During 1996 and
1997, the relief food delivered by WFP to southern
Sudan constituted only 12 per cent and 38 per cent
respectively of assessed needs (Deng 1999: 70). For
the same years, WFP received only 62 per cent
(US$25 million) and 50 per cent (US$22 million) of
its total annual appeal for its humanitarian
operations in southern Sudan. By June 1998, when
the famine reached its peak in Bahr el Ghazal, the
UN and WFP had received only 48 per cent and 54
per cent of their respective appeals (US$109 million
and US$32 million). As a result the minimum food
requirement target was only met by the WFP in
November 1998, seven months after the famine
became apparent in April (Deng 1999: 72).
Instead of challenging the changes in international
aid policy that steadily reduced relief entitlements,
the leading aid agencies operating in southern
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Source: WFP/Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
Figure 4: WFP food deliveries to regions of southern Sudan 1993–7
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Sudan became complacent and accommodating of
crisis. When the famine occurred in 1998, some
aid agencies resisted recognising the famine,
preferring to ‘normalise’ it by describing it as
‘extreme distress’ or ‘crisis’ or even ‘normal
transitory food insecurity’ (Deng 1999: 6). By the
time crude mortality and malnutrition rates
reached unacceptable levels, most British aid
agencies, which were among the few aid agencies
operating in Bahr el Ghazal, curiously decided that
the crisis in Sudan did not warrant a national
appeal. While the aid agencies were divided about
the severity of the situation, the media intervened
and press coverage of Sudan peaked in May (as
shown in Figure 5), resulting in the announcement
of a national appeal for the Sudan famine victims
by all British aid agencies on 21 May 1998.
It was hardly surprising that the food security
monitoring systems implemented by these agencies
were insensitive to increasing vulnerability in Bahr
el Ghazal region in 1998. Most of these systems
were designed under the doctrine of ‘Africans do
not starve, they cope’ that tends to normalise any
crisis. For example, the ‘food economy assessment’
estimates of the vulnerable population in 1998
show not only a considerable decline in
vulnerability in Bahr el Ghazal but also show no
significant difference in vulnerability among the
regions of southern Sudan (Deng 1999: 99). Also
during the early stages of the famine, valuable time
was wasted as explicit criteria or standards for
defining an emergency or famine were missing,
while some leading aid agencies were concerned to
project the success of their programmes – for fear
of jeopardising their long-term activities – and
reluctant to accept the reality of famine. At the time
famine was gaining momentum in Bahr el Ghazal
in March/April, the UN operation (Operation
Lifeline Sudan) was more concerned about the
success of their polio eradication campaign in
meeting global targets (Deng 1999: 82). Some of
these aid agencies even concealed facts about the
famine from the media and took measures
designed to manage the press in a way reminiscent
of the Sudanese government’s attitude to press
freedom (Alagiah 1998).
5 Conclusion
The southern Sudan famine of 1998, though
primarily caused by civil warfare, cannot be
attributed entirely to internal factors. This analysis
has shown how global factors translated into
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Figure 5: Selected coverage of Sudan in the British press 1997–8
Source: Christian Aid (UK)
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increased household vulnerability to famine,
through causing both the civil war and an
intensification of counter-insurgency warfare. The
prevalent view, which ‘internalises’ the causes and
costs of contemporary civil wars and their
accompanying famines, needs to be revisited in the
light of growing evidence that highlights the global
dimension. While internal factors are important,
they are not sufficient to describe the bigger picture
and the global responsibility for localised suffering.
So what lessons can we draw from the 1998 famine
in Sudan?
First, the analysis of the Sudan civil war shows the
role of global causes that will require global
solutions. International actors should accept that
they are part and parcel of the current civil war and
they should not shirk their responsibility for
causing conflict and ‘war famines’. Specifically,
while the British government blames the Sudan
government or the rebels for the conduct of civil
war, it should equally accept its own moral
responsibility in the colonial genesis of these crises.
The increasing analytical emphasis on internal
causes and the primacy of internal solutions has
become a scapegoat for the international
community to absolve itself of responsibility, which
is paradoxical in a world characterised by a
discourse of globalisation.
Second, the civil war in Sudan has shown how the
extraction of mineral resources by multinational
corporations and internationally sponsored
development have caused the current conflict and
sustained it through counter-insurgency warfare.
The commonly held view, that the war is a result of
the criminal acquisitive ‘greed’ of rebels triggered
by mineral resources, masks the global dimension
– particularly the ‘greed’ of multinational
corporations that are increasingly becoming key
players in causing and sustaining civil wars. The
case of Sudan presents a classic example of the
ambiguous encounter and apparent coalition
between humanitarianism and multinational
corporations, that requires a global solution. The
inability of the international community to protect
and assist communities who are subjected to
increasing vulnerability, recurrent famines and
gross human rights abuses simply because of
extraction of their own mineral resources is a
challenge to global values.
Third, the case of the Sudan famine in 1998 shows
how humanitarian agencies operating in political
emergencies run the risk of compromising the
criteria and standards for defining a famine or
emergency by ‘normalising’ crisis, largely for fear of
jeopardising their long-term programmes. The lack
of standardised and globally accepted explicit
criteria or standards for defining a famine or
emergency poses a real risk of accepting different
life chances for different populations (Bradbury
1998: 332). While there are opportunities for
pursuing rehabilitation programmes during civil
wars, communities in the conflict areas are still
highly risk-prone (Deng 2002a) and the argument
of sustainability should be used cautiously,
particularly in the context of endogenous counter-
insurgency warfare.
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Notes
* This article draws from Deng (1999) and the author’s
doctoral research fieldwork, which was generously
funded and facilitated by the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), Hugh
Pilkington Trust, Christian Aid, Catholic Relief
Services, World Food Programme (WFP) and Sudan
Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA).
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